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BULL-DOG SAUCE FOR THE JAPANESE SOUL? 
COURTS, CORPORATIONS, AND 
COMMUNITIES—A COMMENT ON  
HALEY’S VIEW OF JAPANESE LAW  
CURTIS J. MILHAUPT∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
A few years ago, in the immediate aftermath of Livedoor’s sensational 
bid for Nippon Broadcasting Corp. and the promulgation of governmental 
guidelines on hostile takeovers permitting the use of a poison pill defense, 
I published In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in 
Japan (“Delaware’s Shadow”).1 In it, I drew parallels between legal and 
market developments in the 1980s in the United States (more specifically, 
in Delaware, the legal home of most large public companies in the United 
States) and similar developments in Japan in the 2000s.  
In the three and a half years since that essay was published, events in 
Japan have continued to unfold in interesting ways. Although unsolicited 
bids in Japan have not become commonplace, they are no longer as rare as 
a sighting of Haley’s Comet.2 There have been about ten hostile bids in the 
post-Livedoor period from late 2005 to the end of 2007. There has been an 
explosion of interest in takeover defenses, and today about four hundred 
publicly traded Japanese firms have adopted some form of shareholder 
rights plan, although from an American perspective most of the plans have 
taken a highly unusual form. Japanese courts have decided several more 
cases arising out of contests for corporate control, laying the foundation—
as yet uneven and incomplete—for a Japanese takeover doctrine. One of 
these cases, Steel Partners Japan Strategic Fund (Offshore), L.P. v. Bull-
Dog Sauce Co.3 (“Bull-Dog Sauce”), contains a rather startling ruling from 
the Tokyo High Court which, if widely adopted by the judiciary, could 
 
 
 ∗ Fuyo Professor of Japanese Law; Professor of Comparative Corporate Law; and Director, 
Center for Japanese Legal Studies, Columbia Law School. Emi Takeda, L.L.M. (2007), Columbia Law 
School, provided excellent research assistance. 
 1. Curtis J. Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in Japan, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 2171 (2005). 
 2. Since I could not find a way to use this in the title, I am wedging it in here, with apologies to 
readers.  
 3. 1809 SHŌJI HŌMU 16 (Sup. Ct., Aug. 7, 2007). 
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have a profound and probably stifling impact on the market for corporate 
control in Japan.  
These developments are timely for a celebration of John Haley’s 
career. One of Haley’s important contributions to our understanding of 
Japanese law is his claim that a communitarian ethos permeates the 
formation of law in Japan, particularly in the hands of the courts. 
Commentators have long described the Japanese firm in communitarian 
terms. Recall Ronald Dore’s “employee-favoring” Japanese firm4 or 
Zenichi Shishido’s depiction of the Japanese “Company Community.”5 
The rise of hostile takeovers in Japan poses big challenges for the 
Japanese firm in its postwar incarnation. A robust takeover market—even 
one that stopped well short of U.S. volumes of activity—would put 
tremendous pressure on the facets of Japanese corporate governance most 
closely associated with communitarian ethos, such as expectations of long-
term employment, smooth inter-generational transitions in top 
management, and relatively stable linkages between the firm and its key 
providers of capital and other inputs.6  
With this tension between the community and market-favoring aspects 
of current Japanese corporate governance in mind, and in preparation for 
this celebration of Haley’s work, I reread The Spirit of Japanese Law.7 The 
final passage states:  
The defining pattern for Japanese law, during the course of the 
twentieth century, has been its communitarian orientation. How 
enduring will be this emphasis can only be guessed at. To what 
extent it will continue into the next century is open to question. . . . 
Change through learning from the West, concern for individual 
autonomy, and the views of scholars are also predominant features 
of the spirit of Japanese law. During the next century, perhaps their 
combined influence, along with economic imperatives, will produce 
another transforming change. . . . 
 More certain is the proposition that Japanese judges will 
shoulder a large share of the responsibility for whatever change may 
 
 
 4. RONALD DORE, STOCK MARKET CAPITALISM, WELFARE CAPITALISM: JAPAN AND GERMANY 
VERSUS THE ANGLO-SAXONS (2000). 
 5. Zenichi Shishido, Reform in Japanese Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: Current 
Changes in Historical Perspective, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 653, 654 (2001). 
 6. Contrast the recent depiction of shareholders by the Vice Minister of Economy, Trade and 
Industry as “stupid, greedy, adulterous, irresponsible and threatening.” Andrew Morse & Sebastian 
Moffett, Japan’s Companies Gird for Attack, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2008, at A1. 
 7. JOHN OWEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW (1998). 
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come through law. They cannot evade or shift it to others. Within 
law’s domain they will have the last word.8 
Significantly, although Haley focuses on the courts, he recognizes that 
the entire lawmaking production process in Japan gives life to this 
community-favoring spirit. He writes, “[t]he ways in which legal rules are 
made, enforced, interpreted, and applied not only reflect Japan’s 
communitarian emphasis but also contribute to its endurance in face [sic] 
of inexorably eroding influences.”9 As we will see, this is an insightful 
perspective on the formation of takeover law and policy in Japan. 
In this short Essay, I take stock of the recent hostile takeover 
developments in Japan with an eye toward Haley’s conception of Japanese 
law and its trajectory into the future. Part I briefly outlines my major 
arguments in the previous essay. Readers familiar with that work can fast-
forward to Part II, which examines post-Livedoor developments. Part III 
takes stock of these developments in light of Haley’s ideas about the 
animating principle of law and the role of the courts in twentieth-century 
Japan. I conclude that Haley’s perspective is very helpful in understanding 
how the judiciary has responded to legal issues arising out of takeover bids 
thus far. But an examination of how the courts wound up with this issue 
and how they have resolved it to date sheds light on some potentially 
negative consequences and limitations of this approach, particularly as the 
Japanese economy and society become more heterogeneous.  
I. LIVEDOOR AND THE TAKEOVER GUIDELINES 
In extremely brief overview, Delaware’s Shadow depicted a Japanese 
system of corporate governance in flux, buffeted by both external and 
internal forces. When markets changed in the 1990s, corporate law that 
was formerly irrelevant or complementary to postwar Japanese economic 
institutions became problematic. Dissatisfied with the constraints imposed 
by law, market participants responded as they did in the United States two 
decades earlier: by pursuing legal strategies, adapting to governance or 
incentive structures outside the legal system, and making use of the new 
environment to push the edges of “acceptable” market conduct. These 
actions thrust novel transactions into the realm of contemplation and, in 
turn, raised new questions for the legal system to answer. Many of the 
parallels between Delaware in the 1980s and Japan in the 2000s are 
 
 
 8. Id. at 211–12. 
 9. Id. at 17. 
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striking. In both systems, market and legal changes reverberated through 
the political economy, transforming existing corporate governance 
institutions and catalyzing further development of the corporate law. In 
contrast to developments in the United States, however, these changes in 
Japan involved large-scale transplantation of foreign legal technologies 
and standards, while market forces have remained far more muted than in 
the United States.  
For Japan, the rise of hostile takeovers presages further acceleration in 
the reconfiguration of its postwar economic system, with major 
implications for its legal system as well. Delaware’s Shadow ventured the 
(relatively safe) prediction that the judiciary would take on a higher profile 
as arbiters of market conflict as a result of the spike in takeover activity.10 
Indeed, as the Livedoor episode shows, the rise in hostile takeover activity 
in Japan beginning in the 2000s brought the Japanese judiciary into much 
closer contact with a central issue posed by any takeover: who decides 
whether control over corporate assets will be transferred?  
A. Livedoor 
The first and most dramatic illustration of this new trend is the 
Livedoor bid for Nippon Broadcasting System (“NBS”) in 2005. Since 
that transaction is fully described in Delaware’s Shadow,11 I will focus 
exclusively on the judicial decision, rendered in response to the bidder’s 
(Livedoor’s) request for an injunction to prevent incumbent management 
of the target (NBS) from issuing a block of warrants to its de facto parent 
company. Exercise of the warrants would have dramatically diluted 
Livedoor’s holdings in NBS. 
The Tokyo High Court affirmed the District Court’s decision to enjoin 
the warrant issuance as “grossly unfair,” enunciating the following rule: 
In principle, where a contest for corporate control has emerged, it 
constitutes a grossly unfair issuance (Commercial Code §280-39(4); 
§280-10) to issue warrants, the primary purpose of which is for 
existing management or a specific shareholder who exercises 
 
 
 10. It is true that the judiciary played some role in the market for corporate control in Japan in 
the past. See Shūwa K.K. v. K.K. Chūjitsuya, 704 HANREI TAIMUZU 84 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., July 25, 
1989) (enunciating a primary purpose test for a share issuance to a white knight). However, it would 
be hard to make the Haley-esque argument that the courts were central to the formation or sustenance 
of a communitarian orientation in Japanese corporate law and governance in postwar Japan. 
Nonetheless, the judiciary undoubtedly buttressed a key feature of Japanese corporate life in the 
postwar period: lifetime employment.  
 11. Milhaupt, supra note 1, at 2178–80. 
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influence over management to retain control, by diluting the 
holdings of another shareholder. However, . . . where the hostile 
bidder (1) intends to make a target company or its affiliates 
repurchase the shares for a premium after the stock price increases 
(is engaged in greenmail); (2) intends to transfer intellectual 
property, know how, corporate secrets, key business transactions or 
customers, which are vital for the management of the company, to 
the bidder or its affiliates (is engaged in “scorched earth” policies); 
(3) has acquired the target company’s shares so that after acquiring 
control, the bidder can liquidate assets to secure or pay off bidder’s 
debts or those of related companies; or (4) obtains temporary 
control of management to sell off valuable assets unrelated to the 
core business such as real estate or securities in order to pay a one-
time dividend from the proceeds, or sell the stock after having 
driven up the stock price due to the high dividend—in other words, 
where there is an abusive motive of exploiting the target—then it is 
not appropriate to protect the bidder as a shareholder, and if it is 
clear that . . . the interests of other shareholders will be harmed, 
issuance of warrants may be permitted as appropriate in order to 
preserve or protect the Board of Directors’ control rights, within the 
limits of necessity and appropriateness as to method of resistance.12 
Finding insufficient evidence that any of these abusive motives were 
present in Livedoor’s bid, it concluded that NBS’s board had issued the 
warrants with the primary purpose of preserving management’s control. 
Accordingly, the court enjoined the issuance. Note the similarities between 
the rule set out by the High Court, with its implicit threat analysis and 
proportionality requirement, and the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.13 (Unocal authorizes defensive 
measures in response to a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness, 
provided the response is proportionate to the threat). But the Japanese 
High Court emphasizes that management has broad latitude to evaluate 
corporate value “from a mid- to long-term perspective relating to 
economic factors, changes in social and cultural sensibilities of citizens, 
developments in technology affecting the industry, and so on.”14 In short, 
 
 
 12. Nippon Hōsō K.K. v. Livedoor K.K., 1173 HANREI TAIMUZU 125 (Tokyo H. Ct., Mar. 23, 
2005) (Appeal from Injunction Against Issuance of Warrants). Note the parallel to the early Delaware 
case, Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964), in which the court’s first attempt to fashion a rule on 
defensive measures turned on an assessment of motives. 
 13. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 14. Livedoor, 1173 HANREI TAIMUZU at 134. 
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the High Court’s decision presages the development of a Unocal rule with 
Japanese characteristics, setting an outer boundary for entrenchment 
attempts by incumbent management but sanctioning defenses to protect a 
broad range of corporate interests far beyond shareholder value.15 
B. Ministry Takeover Guidelines 
The other key development at this time was the joint promulgation of 
Takeover Guidelines by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
(“METI”) and the Ministry of Justice. As cross-shareholding declined in 
the 2000s and “in light of concerns about the steady rise of hostile bids,”16 
the ministries established a Corporate Value Study Group composed of 
legal experts and business representatives to consider an appropriate 
policy response to hostile takeover activity. The Study Group’s interim 
report, issued in March 2005 in the midst of the Livedoor controversy, 
followed extensive research and consultations with experts regarding 
Anglo-American takeover defenses and legal precedents.  
The report notes that the establishment of defensive measures in Japan 
had been hampered by uncertainty over their legal effect, a paucity of 
precedents and experience, and a lack of consensus on what constitutes 
reasonable defensive measures.17 It then favorably cites an opinion of the 
Ministry of Justice that “[i]f adjusted for Japanese circumstances, most 
defensive measures recognized in the U.S. and Europe can also be 
implemented in Japan.”18 The report provides an exhaustive analysis of 
Delaware’s experience with defensive measures, in particular the poison 
pill, and focuses on the Unocal rule and its progeny.  
Significantly, however, the report makes clear that defensive measures 
should be implemented to protect corporate value, a concept astutely 
defined in such a way as to place share price in a human, communitarian 
context: 
 
 
 15. Unocal similarly suggests that a broad range of considerations is permissible for a board in 
deciding whether to raise defenses to a bid. However, subsequent cases, particularly Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), and cases applying it, cabin those 
considerations of non-shareholder interests significantly.  
 16. KIGYŌ KACHI KENKYŪ KAI [CORPORATE VALUE STUDY GROUP], DAI 8 KAI TEKITAITEKI 
BŌEISAKU (KIGYŌ KACHI BŌEISAKU) NO SEIBI, KIGYŌ KACHI KENKYŪKAI NO RONTEN KŌKAI NO 
KOSSHI TO KIGYŌ KACHI BŌEI SHISHIN SAKUTEI NI MUKETA TAIŌ (2) [8TH MEETING, SETTING FORTH 
MEASURES TO DEFEND AGAINST HOSTILE TAKEOVERS (MEASURES TO PRESERVE CORPORATE 
VALUE), SUMMARIZING DISCLOSURE ISSUES RAISED BY CORPORATE VALUE STUDY GROUP, AND 
ESTABLISHING SCHEME FOR PRESERVING CORPORATE VALUE (2)] 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.meti.go.jp/committee/materials/downloadfiles/g50307a11j.pdf. 
 17. Id. at 18. 
 18. Id. at 19. 
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The price of a company is its corporate value, and corporate value is 
based on the company’s ability to generate profits. The ability to 
generate profits is based not only on managers’ abilities, but is 
influenced by the quality of human resources of its employees . . . 
good relations with suppliers and creditors, trust of customers, 
relationships with the local community, etc.19  
Moreover, throughout its reports, the Study Group uses the term 
“corporate community.” We get some insight into what this term means 
when the Study Group lists “abilities peculiar to Japanese companies”: 
cultivating human resources peculiar to the firm to produce product 
differentiation, forging good relations with valued business partners, 
building trust with customers and the regional economy, unique know-
how, and organizing power effective to enhance long-term corporate 
value.20 Thus, while borrowing heavily from Delaware takeover doctrine 
in formulating its policy recommendations, the Study Group endorsed a 
more holistic, stakeholder-oriented vision of the firm than is typical of the 
Delaware courts and market participants in the United States. 
Based in part on the Study Group’s report, Takeover Guidelines were 
jointly issued by METI and the Ministry of Justice in May 2005. The 
Takeover Guidelines reflect the influence of Delaware jurisprudence, 
although they place more emphasis on advance shareholder approval of 
defensive measures as a means of ensuring fairness than does Delaware 
doctrine.21 Most significantly, the Takeover Guidelines explicitly endorse 
the shareholder rights plan (the “poison pill” in M&A jargon) as a 
defensive measure under Japanese corporate law. 
After the dust had settled a year later, the Study Group noted that “we 
can say that Japan is changing from the situation without rules to the 
situation with formulated rules.”22 
 
 
 19. Id. at 22. 
 20. CORPORATE VALUE STUDY GROUP, CORPORATE VALUE REPORT: TOWARD THE FIRM 
ESTABLISHMENT OF FAIR RULES IN THE CORPORATE COMMUNITY 60 (2006). 
 21. MINISTRY OF ECON., TRADE & INDUS. & MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINES REGARDING 
TAKEOVER DEFENSE FOR THE PURPOSES OF PROTECTION AND ENHANCEMENT OF CORPORATE VALUE 
AND SHAREHOLDERS’ COMMON INTERESTS 6–14 (2005). 
 22. CORPORATE VALUE STUDY GROUP, supra note 20, at 59. 
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II. POST-LIVEDOOR DEVELOPMENTS 
As noted in the Introduction, about ten unsolicited bids were made in 
the three years following the Livedoor case. Not surprisingly, the 
promulgation of the Guidelines coupled with the existence of these bids 
sparked a surge of interest in defensive mechanisms among publicly 
traded Japanese firms. As Table 1 shows, as of July 2007, 371 firms had 
adopted a shareholder rights plan. These Japanese poison pills have taken 
a distinctive form. As the Table shows, the overwhelming majority of pills 
are of the pre-warning (jizen keikoku) variety. This is not a legal 
instrument; rather it is a public statement by the board setting forth the 
procedures to be followed when a large-scale acquisition of the company’s 
shares is made. The public statement declares that if an acquirer starts an 
acquisition or takeover bid that would result in the acquirer holding a 
specified percentage (generally twenty percent) of the target company’s 
outstanding shares, the board of the target will establish a special 
committee to evaluate the bid and consider alternatives. If the committee 
determines that the acquisition would damage the “corporate value of the 
company or the common interests of shareholders,” it will recommend that 
the board issue warrants to the shareholders other than the bidder.  
TABLE 1: TYPES OF DEFENSIVE MEASURES 
Pre-warning type Trust type  
As of Number of 
companies 
Ratio 
(%) 
Number of 
companies 
Ratio 
(%) 
July 200623 143 93.5 10 6.5
July 200724 371 97.4 10 2.6
Increase (2007/2006) 2.6x 0 
 
Among pre-warning defensive measures, forty-nine companies 
structured the measure so that shareholders’ approval is required or 
possible.25 Those companies might have attempted to minimize the risk of 
injunction by involving shareholders in the adoption or activation of 
 
 
 23. Amane Fujimoto et al., Tekitaiteki Baishū Boeisaku no Dōnyū Jōkyō [Status of the Adoption 
of Defensive Measures Against Hostile Takeovers], 1776 SHŌJI HŌMU 46, 49 chart 4. 
 24. Amane Fujimoto et al., Tekitaiteki Baishū Boeisaku no Dōnyū Jōkyō [Status of the Adoption 
of Defensive Measures Against Hotile Takeovers], 1809 SHŌJI HŌMU 31, 34 chart 4.  
 25. Id. at 38. 
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defensive measures.26 Interestingly, as shown in Table 2, only 35.5% of 
companies whose defensive measure was structured to require 
shareholders’ approval have set up special committees. This probably 
reflects the idea that a shareholders’ decision is sufficient to eliminate a 
discretionary decision by the board of directors.  
TABLE 2: USE OF SPECIAL COMMITTEES27 
Decision maker  
on defensive measure 
Committee 
formed  
(# of 
companies) 
Committee not 
formed  
(# of 
companies) 
Total  
(# of 
companies)
Ratio (%)
Shareholders’ approval only 11 20 31 35.5
Board approval and (possibly) 
shareholders’ approval 
18 0 18 100
Board approval only 288 34 322 89.4
Total 317 54 371 85.4
A. Bull-Dog Sauce 
An important ruling on defensive measures adopted in the face of a 
hostile bid resulted from a 2007 bid by a U.S. private equity fund for a 
Japanese firm. As of May 2007, the private equity fund Steel Partners and 
its affiliates owned 10.25% of the outstanding shares of Bull-Dog Sauce, a 
condiment maker and household name in Japan listed on the second 
section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange.28 On May 18, 2007, Steel Partners 
Japan Strategic Fund, a Delaware limited liability company, launched a 
tender offer for all of the outstanding shares of Bull-Dog Sauce. The board 
of directors of Bull-Dog Sauce opposed the tender offer and made a 
discriminatory allocation of warrants to shareholders as a defensive 
measure. The board allocated three warrants per share to all existing 
shareholders.29 The warrants were exercisable into one common share of 
Bull-Dog Sauce per warrant. Steel Partners was prohibited from exercising 
the warrants, but it was entitled to receive an amount of cash per warrant 
equal to the initial tender offer price multiplied by one-forth, the projected 
 
 
 26. Kenichi Osugi, What Is Converging? Rules on Hostile Takeovers in Japan and the 
Convergence Debate, 9 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 143, 157–58 (2007).  
 27. Amane, supra note 24, at 39 chart 9. 
 28. Steel Partners Japan Strategic Fund (Offshore), L.P. v. Bull-Dog Sauce Co., Ltd., 1809 SHŌJI 
HŌMU 16 (Sup. Ct., Aug. 7, 2007). 
 29. Id. at 16–17. 
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dilution ratio after the warrants were issued.30 As a result of this measure, 
the number of shares held by Steel Partners would remain the same, while 
the number of shares held by other shareholders would increase fourfold. 
The proposal was approved by special resolution at the annual 
shareholders meeting on June 24, 2007, with 83.4% of the outstanding 
shares voting in favor.31  
On June 13, 2007, prior to the annual shareholders meeting, Steel 
Partners sought a preliminary injunction from the Tokyo District Court to 
enjoin the warrant issuance. The two principal legal issues were (i) 
whether the allocation violated the principle of shareholder equality under 
the corporate law, and (ii) whether the defensive measure was unnecessary 
and unreasonable, and thus “grossly unfair” within the meaning of the 
corporate law.32  
The Tokyo District Court dismissed the request for a preliminary 
injunction.33 The court held that the discriminatory allocation of warrants 
is not in conflict with the principle of shareholder equality when the 
company has taken the measure by special resolution and equal economic 
benefits to shareholders are assured. The court noted that corporate law 
permits other discriminatory practices such as squeezing out minority 
shareholders by a special resolution of the shareholders.34 As to the 
necessity and reasonableness of the defensive measure, the court reasoned 
that a different standard should apply when a defensive measure is 
approved at the general shareholders meeting, as compared to one based 
on a decision of the board of directors. Ultimately, the shareholders have 
the authority to decide who controls the company, and should decide 
whether it is necessary to take defensive measures. The District Court 
concluded that “[t]he necessity of a defensive measure would be denied 
only when the shareholder meeting’s decision is clearly unreasonable.”35  
The Tokyo High Court affirmed, applying a different and rather 
striking line of analysis.36 The court held that discriminatory treatment 
among shareholders, depending on the attributes of the shareholders, does 
not violate the principle of shareholder equality if it is necessary and 
 
 
 30. Id. at 17. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. 
 33. See Steel Partners Japan Strategic Fund (Offshore), L.P. v. Bull-Dog Sauce Co., Ltd., 1805 
SHŌJI HŌMU 43 (Tokyo D. Ct., June 28, 2007). 
 34. Id. at 50–51. 
 35. Id. at 53–54. 
 36. See Steel Partners Japan Strategic Fund (Offshore), L.P. v. Bull-Dog Sauce Co., Ltd., 1806 
SHŌJI HŌMU 40 (Tokyo High Ct., July 9, 2007). 
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reasonable in order to prevent damage to corporate value.37 As to the 
necessity and reasonableness of the measure taken, the court interjected a 
novel line of analysis in finding that Steel Partners was an “abusive 
acquirer” (ranyō teki baishūsha). It based this finding in view of Steel 
Partners’ structure as an investment fund with a purely short-term strategy 
of reselling the shares of the target company at a profit to a third party or 
to the target company itself, or by selling the assets of the target 
company.38 Accordingly, the court affirmed the necessity of the defensive 
measures. The court held that in the face of an “abusive acquirer,” the 
reasonableness test will be satisfied if the defensive measure does not 
cause excessive or unreasonable damage to the bidder. When defensive 
measures are taken against an unreasonable offer, providing the bidder 
with economic benefits equal to those granted the other shareholders does 
not have to be assured.39 Thus, the court affirmed the reasonableness of the 
defensive measure taken by the Bull-Dog Sauce board. A critic of the 
High Court ruling notes that the court did not thoroughly analyze previous 
transactions conducted by Steel Partners before labeling it as abusive and 
that its analysis could chill future investment activities.40 
The Supreme Court affirmed,41 applying a more straightforward 
analysis as to the question whether the warrant issuance was necessary and 
reasonable. Crucially, it avoided an inquiry into the abusiveness of the 
acquirer. Similarly to the District Court,42 the Supreme Court reasoned that 
it is the shareholders who should determine whether damage would arise 
upon acquisition of control by a certain shareholder. The court should 
respect the decision of shareholders unless there is a material defect in the 
decision making process.43 Considering the fact that the proposal to issue 
warrants was approved by 83.4% of the outstanding voting shares, almost 
all shareholders of Bull-Dog Sauce other than Steel Partners agreed that 
the defensive measure was necessary in order to prevent damage to 
 
 
 37. Id. at 47. 
 38. Id. at 50–51. 
 39. Id. at 51. 
 40. Wataru Tanaka, Bull-Dog Sauce Jiken no Hōteki Kentō (Jō) [Legal Analysis of Bull-Dog 
Sauce Case, Part I], 1809 SHŌJI HŌMU 4, 9–12 (2007). 
 41. Steel Partners Japan Strategic Fund (Offshore), L.P. v. Bull-Dog Sauce Co., 1809 SHŌJI 
HŌMU 16 (Sup. Ct., Aug. 7, 2007). 
 42. There are two main differences between the analysis of the District Court and the Supreme 
Court. First, the Supreme Court put more emphasis on the fact that the defensive measure was 
approved by a majority of shareholders, rather than by special resolution as emphasized in the Tokyo 
District Court decision. Second, the Supreme Court decision suggests that the court should only look 
for defects in the shareholder approval process, while the Tokyo District Court indicates that the 
reasonableness of the decision taken by shareholders should also be scrutinized by the court. 
 43. Bull-Dog Sauce, 1809 SHŌJI HŌMU at 18. 
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corporate value. This fact, concluded the Supreme Court, indicates that the 
allocation of warrants is not inconsistent with the principle of equality and 
is not unreasonable. Therefore, the defensive measure was not “grossly 
unfair” under the corporate law.44  
One possible effect of the Supreme Court’s opinion, which emphasizes 
shareholders’ approval as validating the defensive measure, may be to 
encourage the (re-)establishment of corporate ties to stable, long-term 
shareholders, so that management can obtain shareholders’ approval of 
defensive measures in the face of a hostile takeover attempt. Of course, the 
re-emergence of stable and cross-shareholding patterns among Japanese 
firms would once again dampen the market for corporate control.45 
III. SIGNIFICANCE FOR JAPANESE LAW 
Let’s return to Haley’s sense that communitarianism, reflected and 
reinforced in judicial rulings, is the defining quality of Japanese law, while 
keeping in mind his assertion that, ultimately, it is the judges who shoulder 
the work of changing Japanese law. 
Consistent with Haley’s argument, Japanese judges have taken on—or 
been thrust into—the heavy lifting in the controversial issue of takeover 
policy. To be sure, other actors in the political economy, most notably the 
economic bureaucrats at METI but also in the Ministry of Justice, have not 
completely relinquished the reins of authority. Yet the form of their 
involvement has ironically opened the door to the courts. A bit of 
background is warranted here to understand how the courts were placed at 
the center of this issue. 
Consider two interesting facts about the Takeover Guidelines. First, as 
their title implies, the Takeover Guidelines are not law. They are self-
consciously “soft law”—legally unenforceable standards of conduct 
designed to serve as a focal point for the development of consensus on fair 
and reasonable takeover defenses. Indeed, the drafters appear to have been 
extremely successful in this regard, with a recent survey indicating that 
ninety-six percent of corporations will refer to the Guidelines when 
adopting defensive measures.46 Why did Japanese government actors 
resort to soft as opposed to hard (real) law with respect to a matter of 
 
 
 44. Id. at 18–19. 
 45. See Kigyō Kachi Kenkyū Kai [Corporate Value Study Group], Dai 23 Kai Giji Yōshi 
[Summary of 23rd Meeting] (Oct. 26, 2007), available at http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/economic_ 
industrial/gather/eig0000050/index23.html. 
 46. CORPORATE VALUE STUDY GROUP, supra note 20, at 6. 
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central importance to a national economy? We will return to this question 
below. 
Second, the Guidelines were formulated at the initiative of METI, 
which established the Corporate Value Study Group and charged it with 
laying the groundwork for the Guidelines. Of course, the process followed 
in this episode—forming a committee of experts under the auspices of an 
influential ministry to study foreign systems and recommend a solution to 
a Japanese policy problem—has a long history in Japan. This process is 
also noted by Haley as an important means of consensus-building in the 
formation of Japanese law. But METI was arguably not the most 
appropriate agency to formulate a coordinated response to hostile 
takeovers. It has no formal jurisdiction over the corporate or securities 
laws, and other governmental actors such as the Financial Supervisory 
Agency and the Securities Exchange Surveillance Commission seem more 
appropriately situated to formulate a legal/regulatory response to this 
issue.  
These two features of the Takeover Guidelines—their non-legislative 
quality and formulation at the behest of METI—opened the door to 
judicial involvement in takeovers. A legislative response (over which 
METI would have had little control or lasting imprimatur) could have 
eliminated or circumscribed the role of the courts in Japanese takeovers. 
By contrast, since the Takeover Guidelines are rather Delphic, non-
binding, and legally unenforceable standards, they invite—indeed 
require—action by other actors to answer the key question of who decides 
whether control over corporate assets should be transferred. It is not 
obvious that the Japanese courts are the most appropriately situated actors 
to answer this question. But by gravitating toward Delaware judicial 
doctrine as the starting point for the Guidelines, the Corporate Value 
Study Group implicitly ensured heavy involvement by the Japanese courts 
in contests for corporate control.  
As I argued in Delaware’s Shadow, the choice of Delaware judicial 
doctrine as the starting point for the formulation of Japanese takeover 
policy was itself far from obvious.47 Arguably, the U.K. City Code 
represented a more attractive candidate for transplant into Japan than 
Delaware takeover law. Its relatively straightforward rules are much 
simpler to replicate and enforce than a complex body of foreign judicial 
doctrine. And the quasi-administrative role of the Takeover Panel is more 
consistent with traditional Japanese approaches to economic regulation 
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than is Delaware’s court-centric approach. But Delaware corporate law 
had the advantage of familiarity. At least one-third of the Corporate Value 
Study Group’s members had extensive exposure to Delaware corporate 
law.48 Equally importantly for METI and the business constituency to 
which it responds, Delaware takeover jurisprudence is more protective of 
management than the City Code. 
The upshot of the discussion to this point is that, consistent with 
Haley’s analysis, the courts are now front and center in this important area 
of economic policy. For now, at least, “[w]ithin the law’s domain, judges 
rule—even in Japan.”49 But it is important to note the path by which the 
Japanese judiciary arrived at this destination. It was not the result of a 
shared perception of superior institutional competence or overwhelming 
public trust in judicial judgment, but a series of decisions by other players 
acting on a complex blend of motives, including a desire to protect vested 
bureaucratic and corporate interests.  
How will the Japanese courts decide takeover cases in this new era of 
heightened market activity and institutional change? Again, a word of 
background is instructive before examining the conclusion. Indeterminacy 
may be an unavoidable byproduct of open-textured, fact-intensive 
standards such as those the Delaware courts have developed and the 
Takeover Guidelines endorse. Indeterminacy is a criticism frequently 
leveled at the Delaware doctrine,50 and it is likely to apply with even 
greater force to the application of similar standards by Japanese judges, 
most of whom lack any serious training or experience in business and 
finance. Note the three different analyses of the Bull-Dog defensive 
measures by the three courts in that case, despite the fact that all three 
courts drew from the Takeover Guidelines in reaching their decision.  
If open-textured legal standards are an empty vessel, Haley’s work 
suggests that Japanese judges can be expected to fill them with content 
that favors the corporate community over the profit-oriented bidder or the 
selfish, individualistic shareholder. We have already seen a glimpse of this 
propensity in the quote from the Livedoor High Court opinion above. Even 
more striking is the Tokyo High Court’s decision in Bull-Dog Sauce. The 
court focuses exclusively (and without any real analysis) on the bidder’s 
 
 
 48. Seven of the twenty-one members of the Study Group that prepared the Report were either 
corporate lawyers or corporate law scholars. Milhaupt, supra note 1, at 2206. 
 49. HALEY, supra note 7, at 90. 
 50. See, e.g., Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Model of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1915–19 (1998) (arguing that the Unocal test and related takeover doctrines 
are indeterminate because the Delaware courts rely heavily on flexible standards and avoid devices 
that could render application of the standards more predictable). 
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“abusive” quality, which in the eyes of the court derives from its status as 
a profit-oriented investor. A quote from The Spirit of Japanese Law leapt 
off the page as I considered the significance of this ruling. Haley writes 
that for Japanese judges, “[t]he wrongfulness of the behavior is less an 
infraction of any abstract standard of fair play or honest dealing than the 
selfish pursuit of individual interests at the expense of others . . . .”51 The 
High Court’s Bull-Dog Sauce opinion is an example par excellence of this 
judicial tendency to protect the intermediate community (here, the 
corporation and its employees) against threats posed by the pursuit of 
individual interests, without significant regard for universal principles or 
the consequences of its decision for those outside the community. 
Even the Supreme Court’s opinion in this case, emphasizing 
shareholder approval, may be read as a validation of the community over 
the individual in the Japanese context. It is true that the Delaware courts 
would likely have resolved this case in the same way as the Japanese 
Supreme Court. Namely, overwhelming approval of the defensive measure 
by shareholder vote would have insulated the measure from legal 
challenge. But in the Japanese economy, where shareholding has typically 
been used to signify and reinforce underlying business relationships 
between shareholder and firm, shareholder approval may not carry the 
same connotations as in the United States. Particularly given the deference 
Japanese shareholders have typically shown toward management,52 
shareholder approval may have a distinctly community- and consensus-
reinforcing quality, rather than the majoritarian connotation it carries in 
the United States. While the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bull-Dog Sauce 
potentially could have been read as underscoring the responsibility of 
management to explain and justify its actions to frustrate a bid (and 
thereby obtain shareholder approval for those actions), there is little 
evidence that the market interpreted the ruling in this way. Rather, as 
noted above, the case has prompted managers to find or reinforce long-
term shareholding relationships as a means of protecting the firm from 
outsiders.  
In The Spirit of Japanese Law, Haley argues persuasively that the 
judiciary acts as “interpreters of the community’s conscience and sense of 
fairness.”53 He does not delve deeply into the question whether the 
 
 
 51. HALEY, supra note 7, at 176. 
 52. This is not to say that shareholders typically exercise significant voice in U.S. corporations. 
The point is simply that shareholder activism is much less firmly rooted in Japan. Proxy contests and 
institutional investor activism, for example, have been almost unheard of until recently.  
 53. HALEY, supra note 7, at 176. 
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judiciary’s interpretations of community conscience are accurate or even 
appropriate, though his scholarship strongly suggests that the judiciary 
could not maintain the tremendous legitimacy and public respect it enjoys 
if it badly missed the mark as an arbiter of community values. This claim 
is most likely accurate, at least to the extent that the Japanese public is 
aware of judicial decisions. But several questions emerge from this 
admittedly limited and sketchy overview. First, are courts well situated to 
interpret community values? The communitarian ethic espoused in 
Japanese judicial doctrine may be out of step with community sensibilities 
more often than Haley’s analysis would indicate. Certainly there is 
evidence of this in other areas of Japanese law, such as divorce and other 
areas involving intimate human relationships.54 Or perhaps it is more 
accurate to say that the “community” whose values are protected by the 
courts may be increasingly narrow and unrepresentative of Japanese 
society. Is “communitarianism” a more benign word for protectionism of 
specific interests? Haley seems to recognize this possibility himself,55 but 
he does not grapple deeply with its implications for Japan generally or for 
the Japanese judiciary in particular. This question raises an issue of 
considerable significance for the future of Japanese legal development: in 
an increasingly diverse economy and society, can the Japanese judiciary 
retain its legitimacy if its defining role continues to be the interpretation of 
“community” values without regard to universal principles or the effects 
of its decisions on competing interests?  
CONCLUSION 
Recent developments in the Japanese takeover market and law provide 
a wonderful opportunity to reexamine Haley’s The Spirit of Japanese Law. 
Much of his analysis of the Japanese judiciary and its self-perceived role 
seem apt today. The Takeover Guidelines are a fine example of consensual 
rule-making that, Haley argues, imbues Japanese law with its 
communitarian spirit. And in several rulings, recent takeover cases evince 
the important role of the judiciary in reinforcing a distinctive 
communitarian ethic that Haley contends is the central feature of Japanese 
 
 
 54. See SHŌZŌ ŌTA, SHAKAI KAGAKU TOSHITE NO KAZOKUHŌ, CHITEKI ZAISANHŌ NO TANKYŪ 
(2007) (presenting survey evidence that Japanese social attitudes toward divorce are inconsistent with 
judicial doctrine); MARK WEST, LOVESICK JAPAN (forthcoming) (exhaustively surveying judicial 
opinions on family and related cases and raising the specter of a judiciary whose conceptions of 
intimacy are distinctive, if not bizarre and completely out of touch). 
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law, even when applying standards ostensibly derived from a more 
individualistic and market-driven society such as the United States.  
As we celebrate John Haley’s contributions to our understanding of 
Japanese law, application of his analysis to recent developments prompts 
us to re-evaluate the direction and forces of legal change in a changing 
Japan. 
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